3. In the Third Meditation, I have unfolded at
sufficient length, as appears to me, my chief argument for the existence
of God. But yet, since I was there desirous to avoid the use of
comparisons taken from material objects, that I might withdraw, as far
as possible, the minds of my readers from the senses, numerous
obscurities perhaps remain, which, however, will, I trust, be afterward
entirely removed in the Replies to the Objections: thus among other
things, it may be difficult to understand how the idea of a being
absolutely perfect, which is found in our minds, possesses so much
objective reality [i. e., participates by representation in so many
degrees of being and perfection] that it must be held to arise from a
cause absolutely perfect. This is illustrated in the Replies by the
comparison of a highly perfect machine, the idea of which exists in the
mind of some workman; for as the objective (i.e.., representative)
perfection of this idea must have some cause, viz, either the science of
the workman, or of some other person from whom he has received the idea,
in the same way the idea of God, which is found in us, demands God
himself for its cause.
4. In the Fourth, it is shown that all which we
clearly and distinctly perceive (apprehend) is true; and, at the same
time, is explained wherein consists the nature of error, points that
require to be known as well for confirming the preceding truths, as for
the better understanding of those that are to follow. But, meanwhile, it
must be observed, that I do not at all there treat of Sin, that is, of
error committed in the pursuit of good and evil, but of that sort alone
which arises in the determination of the true and the false. Nor do I
refer to matters of faith, or to the conduct of life, but only to what
regards speculative truths, and such as are known by means of the
natural light alone.
5. In the Fifth, besides the illustration of
corporeal nature, taken generically, a new demonstration is given of the
existence of God, not free, perhaps, any more than the former, from
certain difficulties, but of these the solution will be found in the
Replies to the Objections. I further show, in what sense it is true that
the certitude of geometrical demonstrations themselves is dependent on
the knowledge of God.
6. Finally, in the Sixth, the act of the
understanding (intellectio) is distinguished from that of the
imagination (imaginatio); the marks of this distinction are described;
the human mind is shown to be really distinct from the body, and,
nevertheless, to be so closely conjoined therewith, as together to form,
as it were, a unity. The whole of the errors which arise from the senses
are brought under review, while the means of avoiding them are pointed
out; and, finally, all the grounds are adduced from which the existence
of material objects may be inferred; not, however, because I deemed them
of great utility in establishing what they prove, viz., that there is in
reality a world, that men are possessed of bodies, and the like, the
truth of which no one of sound mind ever seriously doubted; but because,
from a close consideration of them, it is perceived that they are
neither so strong nor clear as the reasonings which conduct us to the
knowledge of our mind and of God; so that the latter are, of all which
come under human knowledge, the most certain and manifest-- a conclusion
which it was my single aim in these Meditations to establish; on which
account I here omit mention of the various other questions which, in the
course of the discussion, I had occasion likewise to consider.
