PREFACE TO THE READER
1. I have already slightly touched upon the
questions respecting the existence of God and the nature of the human
soul, in the "Discourse on the Method of rightly conducting the Reason,
and seeking Truth in the Sciences," published in French in the year
1637; not however, with the design of there treating of them fully, but
only, as it were, in passing, that I might learn from the judgment of my
readers in what way I should afterward handle them; for these questions
appeared to me to be of such moment as to be worthy of being considered
more than once, and the path which I follow in discussing them is so
little trodden, and so remote from the ordinary route that I thought it
would not be expedient to illustrate it at greater length in French, and
in a discourse that might be read by all, lest even the more feeble
minds should believe that this path might be entered upon by them.
2. But, as in the " Discourse on Method," I had
requested all who might find aught meriting censure in my writings, to
do me the favor of pointing it out to me, I may state that no objections
worthy of remark have been alleged against what I then said on these
questions except two, to which I will here briefly reply, before
undertaking their more detailed discussion.
3. The first objection is that though, while the
human mind reflects on itself, it does not perceive that it is any other
than a thinking thing, it does not follow that its nature or essence
consists only in its being a thing which thinks; so that the word ONLY
shall exclude all other things which might also perhaps be said to
pertain to the nature of the mind. To this objection I reply, that it
was not my intention in that place to exclude these according to the
order of truth in the matter (of which I did not then treat),but only
according to the order of thought (perception); so that my meaning was,
that I clearly apprehended nothing, so far as I was conscious, as
belonging to my essence, except that I was a thinking thing, or a thing
possessing in itself the faculty of thinking. But I will show hereafter
how, from the consciousness that nothing besides thinking belongs to the
essence of the mind, it follows that nothing else does in truth belong
to it.
4. The second objection is that it does not follow,
from my possessing the idea of a thing more perfect than I am, that the
idea itself is more perfect than myself, and much less that what is
represented by the idea exists. But I reply that in the term idea there
is here something equivocal; for it may be taken either materially for
an act of the understanding, and in this sense it cannot be said to be
more perfect than I, or objectively, for the thing represented by that
act, which, although it be not supposed to exist out of my
understanding, may, nevertheless, be more perfect than myself, by reason
of its essence. But, in the sequel of this treatise I will show more
amply how, from my possessing the idea of a thing more perfect than
myself, it follows that this thing really exists.
